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Philosophy and Theology
The principle of double effect, or better, double-effect reasoning, remains a matter of
discussion in a variety of ways. It plays a role in rival views about whether the use of
condoms is ethically permissible in order to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS
between spouses. In the recent Phoenix abortion case, double-effect reasoning came
into play in the question of whether or not the abortion was “direct killing” or “indirect
killing” in the situation where the life of the mother was threatened by pulmonary
hypertension. Double-effect reasoning was called into service to justify the falsehoods told by undercover agents of Live Action in revealing the illegal practices of
Planned Parenthood employees who cooperated with statutory rape. The doctrine of
double effect is discussed in connection with many practical matters such as these,
but it is also the subject of more theoretical reflection.
With roots in St. Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense, following the
work of Rev. Jean Pierre Gury, SJ, in the 19th century,1 double-effect reasoning is
classically understood to have four conditions, each of which is necessary for an act
to be justified. Double-effect reasoning holds that an action with two effects, one
good and the other evil, is ethically permissible if the following conditions are met:
(1) The action itself, its object, is not intrinsically evil; (2) the evil effect is not a
means to the good effect; (3) the evil effect is not intended as an end; and (4) there is
a morally serious reason justifying allowing the evil effect. Each of these conditions
has been the subject of recent scholarly attention which merit comment.
The Action Itself, Its Object, Is Not Intrinsically Evil
The first condition, that the action itself is not intrinsically evil, is perhaps
the condition that has received the most attention. How precisely one defines “the
action itself,” or “the object of the human act,” remains the topic of intense scholarly
1
For the historical development of double effect, see Christopher Kaczor, “DoubleEffect Reasoning: From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” Theological Studies 59.2 (June
1998): 297–316.
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discussion. Much of this discussion has been occasioned by the work of Rev. Martin
Rhonheimer. His article “The Perspective of the Acting Person and the Nature
of Practical Reason: The ‘Object of the Human Act’ in Thomistic Anthropology
of Action” highlights the role of the intention rather than the physical structure
in defining the human act.2 On this theoretical basis, Rhonheimer also offers his
practical conclusions about the ethics of lying, the use of condoms to prevent HIV/
AIDS transmission between spouses,3 and abortion in situations where the life of the
mother is threatened. Rhonheimer developed his reflections on the latter topic into
his book Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and
Tubal Pregnancies.4 His more extensive reflections on the nature of human action
can be found in his The Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal of
Thomistic Moral Philosophy.5
At least partly in response to Rhonheimer’s work, the journal Nova et Vetera, in
its Winter 2008 issue, sponsored a symposium on moral action, in both its physical
aspects and its non-physical, intentional aspects. Stephen Brock, Lawrence Dewan,
Kevin Flannery, and Steven Long devoted meticulous and probing consideration to
how to understand the object of the human act in light of Aquinas’s works, Veritatis
splendor, and recent scholarly contributions to the debate.6 Brock and Dewan’s contributions merit particular attention and, though lengthy, are highly instructive. In a
similar line of interpretation, Steven Jensen, in his book Good and Evil Actions: A
Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas, critiques a kind of Abelardian tendency to
downplay the importance of the physical character of the object of the human act.7
The very first condition of double-effect reasoning is often the crux of the debate,
at least among those in the natural law tradition, but the other conditions of double-

Martin Rhonheimer, “The Perspective of the Acting Person and the Nature of Practical Reason: The ‘Object of the Human Act’ in Thomistic Anthropology of Action,” Nova
et Vetera 2.2 (Fall 2004): 461–516.
2

Martin Rhonheimer, “The Truth About Condoms,” Tablet (July 10, 2004): 10–11; and
Benedict Guevin and Martin Rhonheimer, “On the Use of Condoms to Prevent Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5.1 (Spring 2005):
40–48.
3

Martin Rhonheimer, Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to
Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2009). For a critique of Rhonheimer’s view, see William E. May, “Martin Rhonheimer and
Some Disputed Issues in Medical Ethics: Masturbation, Condoms, Craniotomies, and Tubal
Pregnancies” Linacre Quarterly 77.3 (August 2010): 329–352.
4

5
Martin Rhonheimer, The Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal
of Thomistic Moral Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2008), 195–249.

Brock, “On (Not Merely) Physical Objects of Moral Acts,” 1–62; Dewan, “St. Thomas,
Rhonheimer, and the Moral Object,” 63–112; Flannery, “Aristotle and Human Movements,”
113–138; and Long, “Veritatis splendor § 78 and the Moral Act,” 139–156.
7
Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
6
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effect reasoning have also given rise to scholarly discussion, particularly among
philosophers outside the natural law tradition.
The Evil Effect Is Not a Means to the Good Effect
Consider this case raised by Neil Delaney: “Suppose an FBI agent wants to
collapse a building housing a terrorist cell. He notices a hostage wearing a bandolier
of explosives standing right beneath the primary support column to the structure.
As luck would have it the FBI agent has only a firearm and very little time to act
so as to destroy the terrorist cell. So he fires his bullet at the bandolier worn by the
hostage, blowing the hostage to smithereens and collapsing the building with the
force of the explosion of the bandolier.” 8 Would the death of the hostage be intended
by the FBI agent? If so, then the agent’s action violates double-effect reasoning. If
not, then his action may be justified if the other conditions are met.
One way of construing the difference between intended and unintended consequences is by considering the chronological order of the appearance of the effects. The
explosion of bandolier brings about two effects—the death of the innocent hostage
and the deaths of the terrorists—but does not bring about both effects simultaneously.
The death of the hostage occurs first, and the death of the terrorists comes about a
short time later via the collapse of the building. Does the order of the effects make
the earlier effect an intended means to the later effect? In this case, is the death of
the hostage a means to stopping the terrorists?
The answer to this question is negative. Clearly, one effect can appear before
another effect without being the means to that effect. Post hoc does not entail
propter hoc. In a gravid cancerous uterus case, the removal of the cancer occurs
first, and the death of the previable human being in utero comes second, but it does
not follow that the death of the fetus is the means to removing the cancer.
Another way of construing the difference between intended and unintended
consequences is by assessing how “close” one effect is to another effect. Clearly,
in this case, the effect of the death of the hostage is closely linked to the effects of
the building’s collapse and the death of the terrorists. So, if effects that are closely
linked are all intended, then the death of the hostage is intended and therefore
impermissible.
This way of distinguishing intention from foresight also does not succeed.
Consider another example, from Lawrence Masek:
Suppose I turn on a light bulb on a hot summer night. I then run an air conditioner to compensate for the heat from the light bulb. A criterion of closeness
seems to entail both that I intend the heat from the light bulb and the noise from
the air conditioner. In fact, I regard both effects as nuisances, not as means to
my ends. The strict definition correctly classifies them as side effects, even
though they unavoidably occur simultaneously with my turning on the light
bulb and running the air conditioner. (“Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine
of Double Effect,” Philosophical Quarterly, July 2010)

Neil Delaney, “Two Cheers for ‘Closeness’: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect,”
Philosophical Studies 137.3 (February 2008): 335–367.
8
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This example, I believe, shows why not all “close effects” are in fact intended, but
the force of the example can be made even more evident. No sane person can both
intend and not intend the same effect at the same time. But if close effects are also
intended, then in this example the person intends both to make the room hotter (in
virtue of intending stricto senso turning on the light and its close effect of the light’s
heating up the room) and not to make the room hotter (in virtue of turning on the
air conditioner). But this is absurd because a (sane) person cannot at the same time
both intend to make the room hotter and also not intend to make the room hotter.
However, a person could turn on the light and the air conditioner at the same time,
so close effects must not be part of the means that are intended.
The Evil Effect Is Not Intended as an End
For Alison Hills, the interiority of intention, its nonpublic nature, renders
double-effect reasoning problematic. She writes, “the DDE [doctrine of double effect]
may be correct, but it is nearly practically useless: we cannot use it to make moral
assessments of other agents unless we can tell what they intend to do. If there is no
distinction between intentions and foreseen consequences, then DDE cannot be true.
If there is no way of telling what other agents intend, then DDE is of little practical
significance” (“Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect,”
Philosophical Studies, March 2007). The epistemological problem is ever-present
in double-effect reasoning insofar as what one intends depends in part on what one
believes, and what one believes is not (always) readily evident to outside observers.
Consider the following case, from Lawrence Masek’s article, of a woman who does
not believe she is pregnant: “She does not know that she is pregnant, or that the pill
is an abortifacient that can cure her nausea only by killing her foetus. According to
the definition of intention stated above, the woman does not intend her foetus’ death
because she does not believe that the pill will kill it. Defining intention without referring to the woman’s beliefs would entail that she intends the foetus’ death without
having any idea that it even exists.” Intention itself, as well as the beliefs that intentions
presuppose, is not directly evident to outside observers. In so far as ethics is for the
sake of making judgments about others, double-effect reasoning is useless.
The objection raised by Hills presupposes that the purpose of ethics is to make
it possible for us to judge other agents in their concrete activities. I do not believe
this is the purpose of ethics. Indeed, precisely because intentions and beliefs are not
publically accessible, it is unreasonable and immoral to judge other people as if we
could come to a definitive, infallible judgment. It is important for us as agents to
try to figure out what is the morally right thing to do, to consider various plans of
action and whether these plans of action are ethical or not. Double-effect reasoning
can play a part in this process. It is important for us as teachers, parents, or friends to
instruct others in terms of which intentions are permissible and which are impermissible. However, it not important for us to cast ourselves in the role of judge to declare
other people good or evil. An agent’s ethical condition as good or evil is known in
part to himself but is known fully only to God. We can judge that certain kinds of
actions are intrinsically evil, such as intentionally killing innocent human beings. At
the same time, we should refrain from judging people as formally guilty of murder,
unless we have sure grounds for knowing the person’s intentions and beliefs. In some
cases, there will be evidence of such intentions and beliefs from what the agent has
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said or written and from a reasonable interpretation of the agent’s behavior. In other
cases, the agent’s intentions and beliefs remain opaque to us.
But is it not important in certain contexts to know whether someone else is
doing an evil action, like when you are considering marrying someone or admitting
someone into a religious community or considering promoting someone in certain
situations (head of the ethics board)? In certain contexts, is it important to try to
come to the best understanding of the character of another person. We can often
do this by means of having a conversation with them and observing their behavior
to make reasonable inferences to their intentions and beliefs from this behavior.9
But in the end, whether or not a particular action is formally murder is a judgment
that we cannot infallibly make, precisely on account of the interiority of intention
and belief. We can and should judge actions that are materially right or wrong, that
is to say, certain kinds of action if knowingly and willingly chosen undermine the
character of the agent who chooses them. We cannot and should not judge this or
that action of a particular agent as formally evil.
There Is a Morally Serious (Proportionate) Reason
Justifying Allowing the Evil Effect
Of all the conditions of double-effect reasoning, the fourth one is arguably the
least emphasized and explored. Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez have
explicated this fourth condition in as much detail as almost anyone. In an article that
merits careful reading, Robert Anderson summarizes the view of Boyle, Finnis, and
Grisez about how the fourth condition can be violated:
For example, accepting bad side effects might be prohibited (1) because
accepting them violates fairness (such as the injury or death of person Q after
throwing that person on the grenade in the bunker rather than oneself), or
(2) because they result from a fanatical pursuit of a good (such as the untalented person’s wasted life that results from a lifelong quest to play professional
sports, “make it on Broadway,” or the like) or (3) because they result from a
fainthearted pursuit of a good (such as the poor results when students become
convinced that study is hopeless), or (4) because they could have been avoided
(wholly or partially) with a more creative pursuit of a good (such as collateral damage in war that could have been avoided had peace among nations
been sought by means other than force, like diplomacy, UN sanctions, or
embargoes), or (5) because they could have been avoided without the sacrifice
of anything of comparable moral importance (such as the injury and death that
could have been avoided had seat belts been worn). (“Boyle and the Principle
of Double Effect,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 2007)

Anderson adds his own considerations about how to understand the fourth
condition. Indeed, Anderson provides the best and most detailed account of the
fourth condition that I’ve read:
Besides the prohibitions that Boyle, Finnis, and Grisez have explained, others
seem to exist. For example, practical reasonableness would seem to prohibit
accepting bad side effects that result while carrying out futile projects (such
On this point, see Steven J. Jensen, “Getting inside the Acting Person,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 50.4 (2010): 461–471.
9
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as the deaths of those ejected from the lifeboats so that others can hold out
longer, though rescue and making of land are impossible). Again, rules of
efficiency would seem to make unacceptable the bad side effects that result in
the pursuit of a good with very little chance of achieving rather than a good
with reasonable prospects of achieving (such as the failure, wasted effort,
squandered money, and public cynicism that result from a space program
bent on a Mars landing before first attempting a Moon landing). Likewise,
practical reasonableness would seem to prohibit accepting bad side effects
when they can be avoided if a less urgent good is set aside now for pursuit
later (such as the irretrievable loss of antiquities when site work is not halted
so that they can be removed). Finally, the pursuit of a good in such a way that
the bad side effects ruin the good pursued often seems unreasonable (such as
labor’s fidelity to unions when their demands entail the bankruptcy of businesses and so the loss of the benefit packages, favorable working conditions,
jobs, and all else-that labor sought).

The fourth condition of double-effect reasoning remains an aspect that is relatively
under-explored. In a sense, this is to be expected. To determine whether or not there
is a morally sufficient reason for allowing a given evil effect is a judgment for which
there is no algorithm. Since circumstances are infinitely variable, and since circumstances must always play a role in determining whether, all things considered, there
is sufficient reason for allowing a particular evil effect, practical wisdom must be
used in coming to a judgment about the fourth condition. There is no substitute for
prudence in coming to such a determination. Indeed, there is an irreducibly central
role for practical wisdom, not just for cases involving double-effect reasoning but
for the moral life generally.
Christopher K aczor
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